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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Search engines can democratize the Internet by empowering users 
and enabling websites to reach users around the world.  Search engines 
can also become kingmakers online, dominating the impressions that 
users develop of fellow citizens.1  Search engine results associated with 
one’s name may influence future employers, creditors, insurers, and 
many other important decision makers.  
In other work, I have called for important decision makers to be 
regulated in several ways—for example, to reveal what digital sources 
they are consulting to the persons they investigate, and to be prohibited 
from using certain types of information (such as health data) in certain 
decision-making contexts absent bona fide rationales for doing so.2  
 
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland.  Many thanks to Alexander Tsesis for organizing 
an excellent conference panel on issues of digital memory and law, and to Woodrow Hartzog, 
Evan Selinger, Stefan Kulk, Frederik Borgesius, Julia Powles, and Jathan Sadowski for insightful 
comments. 
1. Frank Pasquale, Dominant Search Engines: An Essential Cultural & Political Facility, in 
THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE 401, 402 (Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer eds., 2010), 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2363&context=fac_pubs. 
2. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for 
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to 
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2727955 
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That framework is a good primary focus for regulation regarding 
reputational integrity.  But the regulation of end users of data will 
always be imperfectly enforced, if it comes at all.  Those concerned 
about reputational integrity should also propose and attempt to enact 
legislation governing controllers and processors of data. 
Such regulation already affects consumer reporting agencies, but 
must be revitalized or expanded.  The law must be modernized, or it 
will fail to respond to the exact situations it was written to address.  In 
the United States, new threats to reputation have seriously undermined 
the efficacy of health privacy law, credit reporting, and expungement.  
The common thread is automated, algorithmic arrangements of 
information, which could render a data point removed or obscured in 
one records system, and highly visible or dominant in other, more 
important ones.  To take only one example: it is not much good for an 
ex-convict to expunge his juvenile record, if the fact of his conviction is 
the top Google result for searches on his name for the rest of his life.  
Nor is the removal of a bankruptcy judgment from a credit report of 
much use to an individual if it influences lead generators’ or social 
networks’ assessments of creditworthiness, and would-be lenders are in 
some way privy to those or similar reputational reports.3 
At present, legislative gridlock at the federal level means that 
Congress is unlikely to address this and similar problems.  However, 
states are beginning to do so.4  As they do, they should consult 
European deliberations on what is now called the “right to be 
forgotten.”5  Thanks to the ruling in the Google Spain case issued by the 
 
Automated Authority, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 235 (2011). 
3. Astra Taylor & Jathan Sadowski,  How Companies Turn Your Facebook Activity Into a 
Credit Score, NATION (May 27, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/how-companies-turn-
your-facebook-activity-credit-score/. 
4. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22580 (West 2015).  Some commentators opine that the 
burdens imposed by diverse states’ privacy regulations on Internet firms may render such 
regulations vulnerable to constitutional challenge.  James Lee, Note, SB 568: Does California’s 
Online Eraser Button Protect the Privacy of Minors?, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1173 (2015) 
(noting possible challenges to the “Eraser Law” under the dormant commerce clause).  However, 
work in this vein fails to take into account the vast amount of information available to leading 
Internet firms about their users.  Those firms can almost certainly determine the location of most 
users by state, and adapt information availability accordingly. 
5. The name of the right is misleading.  It might be better understood as the “right not to have 
one damaging incident or characterization dominate important reports about oneself,” or a “right 
for certain content to be delisted on certain important intermediaries.”  But to the extent I use the 
better or more capacious term, I risk my Essay not showing up in searches for legal materials on 
the right to be forgotten (or Westlaw searches like “ATLEAST6(“right to be forgotten”)”).  Yes, a 
skilled searcher could use other keywords.  But most searchers probably will not.  And it is this 
very power of interface design, dominant databases, and routinized or habitual search that is the 
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Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), some data subjects 
can now remove from search results information that is “inadequate, 
irrelevant, no longer relevant or excessive,” unless there is a greater 
public interest in being able to find the information via a search on the 
name of the data subject.6  Such removals are a middle ground between 
info-anarchy and censorship.  They neither disappear information from 
the Internet (it can be found at the original source), nor allow it to 
dominate the impression of the aggrieved individual.7  They are a kind 
of obscurity, which Evan Selinger and Woodrow Hartzog have 
described as an important way of ensuring reputational justice.8 
This Essay explores the possible shape of three versions of a right to 
be forgotten that might be implemented in the United States, either at 
the state or federal level.  Health privacy law, credit reporting, and 
criminal conviction expungement (each discussed in Part IV) need to be 
modernized for the digital age to reflect the power of aggregating 
intermediaries, like search engines, and to maintain the saliency and 
potency of information long after legal processes have determined it to 
be irrelevant or unfair.  In brief, each sector needs to grant data subjects 
the right to force delisting of their names from reports of data 
processing performed by certain important intermediaries. But before 
addressing each of these potential instantiations of the laudable 
principles behind a right to be forgotten in potential expansions of 
extant delisting prerogatives in the United States, I will dispense with 
some background issues in Part II (the range of disputes over salience of 
information on search engine result pages generated in response to 
queries of names) and Part III (the strength of intermediaries’ claim that 
delisting of certain information or links violates the First Amendment).  
II.  DISPUTES OVER SALIENCE IN SEARCH RESULTS 
To understand the stakes of the right to be forgotten discussion, it is 
helpful to compare two case studies on a controversial topic: media 
coverage of homosexuality.  In the United States, the politics of search 
emerged as a national issue in 2012 thanks to a spat between 
 
core topic of this piece. 
6. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), 
(May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&docla 
ng=EN [http://perma.cc/ED5L-DZRK]. 
7. Note: a right of erasure would eliminate the information altogether, and should be 
conceptually distinguished from the right to be forgotten discussed in this piece. 
8. Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Obscurity and Privacy (May 21, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2439866. 
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Republican presidential candidate Rick Santorum and sex advice 
blogger Dan Savage.  Santorum supporters were upset by Savage’s 
persistent, and oft-successful, efforts to link the first result for 
“Santorum” on Google’s first search engine results page (“SERP”) to a 
term related to sex.9  But Google has no legal obligation to change its 
results in response to Santorum’s complaints.10  Nor does there seem to 
be a strong ethical case for an obligation to change the results here, 
either: Santorum was clearly a public figure at the time, and remains 
one at the time this Article is being published.11  
In 2015, another controversy involving shifting perceptions of 
privacy and publicity emerged, with almost diametrically opposed 
responses from attorneys and media ethicists.  The blog Gawker decided 
to publish a compromising series of texts between a male media 
executive married to a woman and a gay male escort with whom he 
allegedly tried to arrange a tryst.12  In order to avoid exacerbating the 
problems of salience this Essay is about to address, I will call this man 
“John Doe.” 
Numerous media commentators condemned the publication.13  And 
some legal experts stated that John Doe, the outed subject of the post, 
might be able to sue Gawker under a theory of “public disclosure of 
private facts” (if the story were true) or defamation (if the story were 
 
9. After Santorum compared gay marriage to bestiality, Savage led an outraged network of 
bloggers to retaliate by linking to a site associating the word “Santorum” with sex.  The anti-
Santorum campaign soon assured that the site was the first result for most of those searching for 
the term “Santorum” on Google.  However, searches for “Rick Santorum” tended to go to the 
candidate’s Wikipedia page or campaign home page.  Santorum supporters complained to 
Google, but to no avail.  Only after he made a surprisingly strong showing in three GOP 
primaries in early 2012 did the anal sex association fade from the very top of search results. 
10. See generally Steve Peoples, Santorum Talks About Longtime Google Problem, ROLL 
CALL (Feb. 16, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_84/-203455-1.html?pg=2& 
dczone=politics (detailing how Santorum’s staffers have found that there was “little they could 
do” in terms of changing the search results). 
11. For example, Santorum is currently running for the 2016 Republican presidential 
nomination and frequently appears on television and in news articles.  See, e.g., Jeremy Diamond, 
Rick Santorum Runs for White House Again, CNN (May 27, 2015, 5:55 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/27/politics/rick-santorum-2016-presidential-announcement/. 
12. Erik Wemple, Conde Nast Exec Story: Gawker Is Keeping Its Sleaze Game In Shape, 
WASH. POST (July 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2015/07/ 
17/conde-nast-exec-story-gawker-is-keeping-its-sleaze-game-in-shape/. 
13. Glenn Greenwald, Max Read’s Moralizing Justification for Gawker’s Vile Article, 
INTERCEPT (July 17, 2015, 11:29 AM), https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/07/17/max-reads-
justification-gawkers-incomparably-vile-article/ (“The article’s 1,000+ comments from Gawker’s 
own readers overwhelmingly expressed disgust, and as The New Republic’s Jeet Heer observed, 
the ‘“debacle’” is ‘“uniting people from all across the political & cultural spectrum . . . in shared 
revulsion.’” (alteration in original)”). 
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false).14   
Were the story, and its aftermath, to dog the outed man as the top 
Google results on his name for five or ten years, there would probably 
be sympathy, but far less opportunity for redress, at least in the United 
States.  Google’s selection and arrangement of stories resulting from the 
query “John Doe” will, almost certainly, continue to prominently 
include links to stories that include the gay escort allegations, even if 
not to the original article (which was taken down within twenty-four 
hours of its appearance).15 
Defenders of the status quo may argue that there is a fundamental 
difference between publishers and aggregators, which justifies the 
differing obligations of Gawker and Google.  But an ethical distinction 
between publication and aggregation does not really stand when we 
critically interrogate both the political economy of media and the ways 
in which reputations are created via a complex interplay of 
computerized and user-generated content.  And for that reason, we 
should question expansive interpretations of the First Amendment that 
would reinforce outdated legal distinctions between those scenarios, as 
well.  For Gawker’s CEO, the reason to share salacious stories, however 
controversial, was simple: 
Whatever information we have, whatever insight we have, whatever 
knowledge we have, our impulse is to share it as quickly as possible, 
and sometimes with as little thought as possible. . . .  Before you can 
 
14. Blake Neff, Gawker’s Nasty Article Could Cost Gawker a Lot of Money, DAILY CALLER 
(July 17, 2015, 3:42 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2015/07/17/gawkers-nasty-article-could-cost-
them-a-lot-of-money/ (“Eugene Volokh, a professor at UCLA, told The Daily Caller News 
Foundation that even if the story is 100 percent true, [John Doe] could potentially sue Gawker for 
publishing private facts that served no public purpose.  ‘The theory is, if there’s certain 
information that has to do with a person’s private life that would generally be seen as offensive to 
have revealed, and that is not newsworthy, that can’t be published,’ Volokh said.  This tort 
doesn’t exist in every state, and Volokh said suits of this nature are typically restricted to where 
the plaintiff lives.  If the state [John Doe] lives in allows such suits, Volokh indicated he would 
have a chance of prevailing.”). 
15. Nick Denton, Taking a Post Down, NICK DENTON (July 17, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://nick. 
kinja.com/taking-a-post-down-1718581684 (“[John Doe’s] embarrassment will not be eased.  But 
this decision will establish a clear standard for future stories.  It is not enough for them simply to 
be true.  They have to reveal something meaningful.  They have to be true and interesting.  These 
texts were interesting, but not enough, in my view.” (emphasis omitted)).  In December of 2015, 
the top ten search results on the name of the outed man related to this nearly half-year-old story, 
at least in venues where I tried the search from a Google interface that was not logged in to a 
particular account.  Given his otherwise low Internet profile, this story may dominate the first 
page of results on his name for the rest of his life—and even that of his wife, who was named in 
some stories. 
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think about it too much, just put it out there, just share it out there.  I 
think that’s the essence of who we are.16 
This accelerationist ethic, of instant release of information, reflects a 
troubling social theory that privileges the rapidity and automaticity of 
machine communication over human values, democratic will formation, 
and due process.17  It is also strikingly similar to Silicon Valley’s own 
ideals about “frictionless sharing.”18  For platforms like Facebook or 
Spotify, users’ likes and actions should be able to be instantly posted to 
their friends, and perhaps to the public at large if the user has 
(intentionally or unintentionally) allowed such publicity.  For Google, 
speedy search results are part of the company’s DNA: its leaders have 
repeatedly insisted on automating as much of search as possible 
consistent with searchers’ experience of quality.19  The company has 
tried to refuse to take into account the interests of the searched (here, 
those whose names are queried—but very often trademark owners or 
others with an interest in terms), when challenged about results. 
What is clear from the Gawker case, though, is that such automation, 
such frictionlessness in algorithmic arrangement of information, 
effectively undoes whatever injunctive relief someone like John Doe 
might get, against Gawker, if he were indeed to sue.  The story itself 
would persist as a virtual scarlet letter atop search queries on his name.  
We could simply reconcile ourselves to such a result, assuming it a 
necessary cost of robust protections of free expression.  Or we could 
look to other nations’ approaches to the balance between privacy and 
free speech.20 
 
16. Jonathan Mahler, Gawker’s Moment of Truth, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2015), http://www.ny 
times.com/2015/06/14/business/media/gawker-nick-denton-moment-of-truth.html. 
17. The acclerationist ethic is articulated well by Nick Land, Alex Williams, and Nick 
Srnicek.  See, e.g., Alex Williams & Nick Srnicek, #ACCELERATE MANIFESTO for an 
Accelerationist Politics, CRITICAL LEGAL THINKING (May 14, 2013), http://criticallegalthinking 
.com/2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-an-accelerationist-politics/ (“We want to accelerate the 
process of technological evolution.”). 
18. Frictionless sharing is critiqued in several law review articles.  See, e.g., William 
McGeveran, The Law of Friction, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15, 17 (analyzing “the benefits and 
drawbacks of frictionless sharing” on the web); Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 
101 GEO. L.J. 689 (2013); Margot Kaminski, Reading Over Your Shoulder, WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. COMMON LAW (Mar. 9 2015), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/2012/03/reading-over-your-
shoulder-social-readers-and-privacy-law/. 
19. Kaminski, supra note 18. 
20. See, e.g., Stefan Kulk & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Freedom of Expression and 
‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Cases in the Netherlands After Google Spain, 2 EUR. DATA PROTECTION 
L. REV. 113, 115 (2015) (“[T]he right to freedom of expression is not absolute, and must be 
balanced against other rights, such as privacy and data protection rights.  The European Court of 
Human Rights says in the context of press publications about freedom of expression and privacy: 
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High-ranking results about a certain searched term can sometimes be 
harmful from either a societal perspective21 or from the perspective of 
an entity with a stake in the search term.22  For example, consider 
Google’s “autocomplete” associations regarding a former first lady of 
Germany, Jane Doe.23  Users typing “Jane Doe” into the search engine 
in 2012 would be likely to see the suggested searches “Jane Doe 
prostituierte” and “Jane Doe escort” underneath their search box.24  The 
suggestions reflect numerous rumors about Jane Doe, who obtained 
over thirty cease-and-desist orders in Germany against bloggers and 
journalists who raised the possibility of sex work in her past.25  Jane 
Doe feared that all those legal victories could be for naught if users 
interpreted the autocomplete suggestions as a judgment on her 
character, rather than an artifact of repeated legal battles. 
For Google, the problem of the autocomplete suggestions is more a 
problem of user education.  But Google itself is continually trying to 
educate searchers, and it seems strange that it would suddenly forswear 
that mission when very simple responses could greatly help someone 
unfairly impugned, smeared, or exposed.26  It will correct the spelling 
of commonly misspelled terms, or put in more common spellings.  Even 
something as basic as a spelling suggestion depends on a series of 
human judgments.  Should the results default to the “standard” spelling, 
or should users simply be warned that their spelling may be off?  In a 
presentation on search quality at an academic conference, one of 
Google’s top engineers emphasized that there is a painstaking, iterative 
interplay between computer science experts and beta testers who report 
 
‘as a matter of principle these rights deserve equal respect.’”). 
21. Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission?  Access, Fairness, and 
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008). 
22. Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115, 
135–36 (2006). 
23. Again, I am using a pseudonym to avoid reinforcing the data subject’s problem. 
24. See Kadhim Shubber, Japanese Court Orders Google to Censor Autocomplete, Pay 
Damages, WIRED (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-04/16/google-
japan-ruling; Ted Rall, Opinion, Why Censoring Search Engines Is a Good Idea, JAPAN TIMES 
(May 20, 2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/05/20/commentary/world-comment 
ary/censoring-search-engines-good-idea/. 
25. Konrad Lischka, Blaming the Algorithm: Defamation Case Highlights Google’s Double 
Standard, DER SPIEGEL INT’L (Sept. 10, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.spiegel.de 
/international/germany/defamation-case-by-[Jane]-[Doe]-highlights—double-standard-at-google-
a-854914.html. 
26. For background on the many functions of search results, see Conor Friedersdorf, Should 
Google Always Tell the Truth?, ATLANTIC (July 4, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology 
/archive/2015/07/should-google-always-tell-the-truth/397697/. 
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on their satisfaction with various results configurations.27  Ranking of 
search results is not a simple technological “product” here; rather, it is a 
social process that at many points could be informed by social values. 
Nevertheless, while the policy for alternative spellings could be 
applied generally once the beta testing was over, each situation like Jane 
Doe’s would require independent judgment anew.  Google fears that 
reputational micromanagers will overwhelm it with requests like hers.  
But is it really so hard for the search engine to, say, turn off the 
autocomplete function for some names?  The company has never 
offered a hard estimate of the costs of responding to these types of 
claims.28  Given its vast resources, it is hard to imagine such a duty 
denting its profits significantly or adversely affecting its mission or 
employees. 
Requests to downrank results on a certain name (and that name 
alone) might also lead to more constructive responses.  For example, the 
firm could simply hire individuals to respond to a justified complainant 
if a problematic site has appeared in name search results.  Both Lilly 
Irani and Adrian Chen have described the manual “disappearing” of 
pornography or violent or disturbing images from platforms like 
Facebook, by paid workers in the Philippines and Morocco.29  Given 
the extraordinary profitability of the dominant search engines, this is a 
task they could take on with respect to ongoing preservation of certain 
delistings. 
 
27. This assertion was made at a conference sponsored by Google at George Mason 
University, on search and competition. For more details on the conference series, see Tom 
Hamburger and Matea Gold, Google, Once Disdainful of Lobbying, Now a Master of Washington 
Influence, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-goog 
le-is-transforming-power-and-politicsgoogle-once-disdainful-of-lobbying-now-a-master-of-washi 
ngton-influence/2014/04/12/51648b92-b4d3-11e3-8cb6-284052554d74_story.html (“The keynote 
address was by Google engineer Mark Paskin, who delivered a lunchtime speech titled 
‘Engineering Search.’”); and Matea Gold and Tom Hamburger, How Google Worked Behind the 
Scenes to Invite Federal Regulators to Conferences, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2014), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2014/04/12/how-google-worked-behind-the-scenes-to-inv 
ite-federal-regulators-to-conferences/.  Lilly Irani has also observed the person-machine interface 
here.  Lilly Irani, Justice for “Data Janitors,” PUB. BOOKS (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.public 
books.org/nonfiction/justice-for-data-janitors (“The emergence of the digital microwork industry 
to tend artificial intelligence shows how labor displacement generates new kinds of work.”). 
28. See Rall, supra note 24 (“Would it really be so terrible for Google to hire 10,000 
American workers to process link deletion requests? . . . Onerous?  Google has a space program.  
It is mapping every curb and bump on America’s 6 million km of roads.  They’re smart.  They 
can figure this out.”). 
29. Adrian Chen, The Laborers Who Keep Dick Pics and Beheadings Out of Your Facebook 
Feed, WIRED (Oct. 23, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation/; 
Irani, supra note 27. 
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Another possible pattern of response would be to outsource the 
determination to a nonprofit entity.  In my article Beyond Innovation 
and Competition, I described symbiotic relationships between Google 
and the Berkman Center at Harvard (regarding malware infected 
sites).30  The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and nonprofits have 
also collaborated to streamline the enforcement of false advertising 
law.31  No internet firm can credibly say a link monitoring and deletion 
obligation is too onerous if they fail to take advantage of the robust civil 
society organizations willing to capably assist in this duty.32 
In a 2006 article, I proposed that individuals unfairly or inaccurately 
portrayed on a dominant search engine’s result pages should, in some 
circumstances, have the right to place an asterisk linking to their own 
reply to the troubling depiction(s).33  Critics have claimed that the 
proposal would either be unworkable or a troubling instance of “forced 
speech”34 or “censored search.”35  I responded to their concerns in 
 
30. Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified 
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105 (2010). 
31. Id.  In the case of FTC investigations into false advertising, 95% of problematic situations 
are quickly resolved in a self-regulatory fashion, by nongovernmental entities.  Id.  This is not a 
recipe for the litigation nightmares industry advocates so frequently invoke.  See also Children’s 
Advertising Review Unit, BETTER BUS. BUREAU’, https://www.bbb.org/council/the-national-part 
ner-program/national-advertising-review-services/childrens-advertising-review-unit/ (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2015) (“CARU is the children’s arm of the advertising industry’s self-regulation system 
and evaluates child-directed advertising and promotional material in all media to advance 
truthfulness, accuracy and consistency with its Self-Regulatory Program for Children’s 
Advertising and relevant laws.” (emphasis omitted)). 
32. Trebor Scholz, Platform Cooperativism vs. the Sharing Economy, MEDIUM (Dec. 5, 
2014), https://medium.com/@trebors/platform-cooperativism-vs-the-sharing-economy-2ea737f1 
b5ad#.csrtvbgch (describing the self-organization of civil society organizations to address 
pressing social problems). 
33. Pasquale, supra note 22, at 135–36. 
34. For a compelling current argument against this being forced speech, see Jennifer A. 
Chandler, A Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary Bias on the Internet, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1129 (2007). 
A prohibition against blocking access to websites or refusing to include them in a 
search engine index would prima facie be an interference with the selection 
intermediary’s selection freedom.  However, the factors outlined above suggest that 
such a rule would not raise the concerns typically associated with compelled speech.  
This is because such a rule is content neutral, it would not curtail the selection 
intermediary’s ability to speak, the selection intermediary would not be understood to 
endorse the website (or it could post disclaimers) and the selection intermediary would 
not be forced to modify its own speech to respond or to avoid triggering the rule. 
Id. 
35. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Don’t Censor Search, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 48, 51 
(2007).  Grimmelmann contends that the asterisk requirement would “hinder users’ ability to 
choose among diverse search engines,” because it “might inhibit the development of better, more 
helpful responses—such as personalized search based on the recommendations of one’s friends, 
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2008.36  Our differences ultimately may not be amenable to reason, but 
I believe the dialogue at least illuminates the divergent strands in First 
Amendment doctrine here. 
It is not impossible to keep the search record of figures like John Doe 
or Jane Doe free of scurrilous or excessively and inappropriately 
compromising material.  To say otherwise is to succumb to techno-
logical reification—a misleading assertion that the way the search 
engine ranks and presents entities now is the one and only way it can be 
done.  When Wall Street investors, or a critical mass of advertisers, 
demand that Google change with the times, it does.  A critical mass of 
voters and policymakers should have similar prerogatives, given 
dominant search engines’ status as an information utility, as critical to 
our time as the railroads were to the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  Given the vast changes in search experience over time, it is 
clear that both user experience and much of the underlying code is 
flexible.37 
III.  FIRST AMENDMENT OPPORTUNISM 
Admittedly, Google has won several lawsuits challenging its 
placement of links to websites in search results, on First Amendment 
grounds.  None of these cases, however, were at the appellate level.  
The judges involved tended to opine beyond the legal principles 
necessary to dispose of the cases.  Marginal plaintiffs launched the 
cases, with nowhere near the resources that Google itself (or even a 
reputable public interest law firm) could provide.  And most 
troublingly, none of the cases considered the First Amendment 
opportunism at the core of Google’s defense: its simultaneous self-
characterization as a speaker when it wanted to avoid lawsuits about 
search results, and as a mere conduit when defending against claims of 
indirect intellectual property infringement and defamation. 
For example, in Langdon v. Google,38 the plaintiff, Christopher 
Langdon, claimed Google had a duty to carry his advertisements, which 
included messages like “China is Evil.”39  A federal district court 
 
or semantic analyses that can automatically put Web pages in a broader context.” 
36. Frank Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 61 (2008). 
37. For instance, Google has itself offered a “right of reply” feature on some Google News 
stories.  See Brad Stone, Names in the News Get a Way to Respond, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2007). 
38. Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007). 
39. Id. at 626; see, e.g., Chris Langdon, Communist China Has Murdered Millions: Boycott 
China, COMMUNIST CHINA IS EVIL, http://soc.culture.irish.narkive.com/mvcyFwgI/for-paul-the-
rabid-rabbit-communist-china-has-murdered-millions-boycott-china; see also Frank Pasquale, 
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dismissed the claim, as it obviously should have: Langdon had no 
constitutional right to balance, and there was no relevant “must-carry” 
statute.40  But the court went well beyond that determination in its 
opinion.  Likely in order to quickly dispose of a scattershot array of 
business torts also alleged by Langdon, it directly analogized Google to 
a newspaper, invoking First Amendment requirements in order to 
dismiss all Langdon’s claims en masse (the jurisprudential equivalent of 
using a tank to destroy a small swarm of flies).  Once this logical leap 
was made, the Supreme Court’s decision in Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v. Tornillo seemed to clearly settle the case.41  In Tornillo, Florida’s 
“right of reply” statute (giving political canidates who had been 
criticized in a newspaper a chance to have their own replies printed in 
the same newspaper) was rejected by the Court as a violation of the 
First Amendment.42  The Langdon court thought the plaintiff’s 
proposed remedies were at least as disruptive of Google’s “message” as 
a right of reply would have been to the Miami Herald.43 
One immediate question arises: why didn’t the court analogize 
Google with the broadcasters at issue in Red Lion Broadcasting v. 
FCC,44 or the cable companies in Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. 
FCC?45  In Red Lion, the Court resoundingly affirmed (by a 7–0 vote) 
the FCC’s prerogative to impose a fairness doctrine on broadcasters.46  
In Turner, the Court upheld must-carry provisions for a cable network 
as constitutional, reasoning that they “further important governmental 
interests” and “do not burden substantially more speech than necessary 
 
Shaming Search Engines, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 6, 2007, 4:57 PM), http://www. 
concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/11/shaming_search.html (recapping the congressional 
concern over search engines’ complicity in the Chinese government’s campaign against dissent, 
as it was expressed in 2006 with the proposal of the Global Online Freedom Act). 
40. Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 634–35. 
41. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974). 
42. Id. at 258 (“It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial 
[editorial] process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as 
they have evolved to this time.”). 
43. Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 630 (“Defendants are correct in their position that the 
injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff contravenes Defendants’ First Amendment rights.” (citing 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256)); see also Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com, 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (involving Chinese critics of Baidu or Google and holding that Baidu’s search engine 
results were protected by the First Amendment). 
44. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
45. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997). 
46. The Supreme Court allowed extensive government regulation of the airwaves in Red Lion, 
reasoning that broadcasters deserve less protection because of the scarcity of the airwaves, and a 
history of governmental regulation in the area.  395 U.S. at 401. 
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to further those interests.”47  At the time of Langdon, the search engine 
market in the United States was much closer to that of the three major 
broadcasters, or oligopolistic cable giants, than it was to the diverse and 
fragmented newspaper market addressed by Tornillo.  This is even truer 
today, as Google continues to entrench a self-reinforcing dominance in 
the United States, and in many other national markets.48 
Eric Goldman has argued that cases like Red Lion and Turner are 
inapplicable here, because the Supreme Court has also found (in Reno v. 
ACLU49) that “the Internet” hosts “vast[,] democratic forums” that lack 
the scarcity characteristic of broadcast media.50  But it takes some 
interpretive work to apply ACLU to a potential must-carry or other 
similar rule.  For Goldman, ACLU’s Internet includes every particular 
firm operating primarily on the net.  But the Court’s rapid, ipse dixit 
setting aside of Red Lion and Turner suggests another, more plausible 
explanation: the ACLU majority was opining on regulation applicable to 
the Internet as a whole, not regulation applicable to any one dominant 
firm (or set of firms) on it.  Moreover, the ACLU Court was dealing 
with a far different phenomenon: the Internet of the mid-1990s did not 
have nearly the influence that today’s Internet has.  Finally, the ACLU 
majority failed to engage in the type of rigorous analysis of the function, 
economics, and social meaning of online life that would be necessary to 
a legitimate immunization of all internet-based firms from regulation of 
the consumer-facing results of their data processing.   
Top search results are, by nature, scarce.  At the time of Red Lion, 
there were three large broadcast networks of roughly equal quality.  
Presently, Google is far and away the best search engine, and as I have 
 
47. Turner, 520 U.S. at 185.  Carrying three mandatory channels was a small burden to a cable 
company, and the burden was outweighed by the furthering of government interests in “(1) 
preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the 
widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair 
competition in the market for television programming.”  Id. at 189. 
48. Top 15 Most Popular Search Engines October 2015, EBIZMBA, http://www.ebizmba 
.com/articles/search-engines [http://perma.cc/9D4L-TAZ2] (last visited Nov. 17, 2015) (showing 
Google as having over three times as many unique monthly visitors as its nearest competitor, 
worldwide). 
49. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
50. Eric Goldman, “Must Carry” Lawsuit Against Search Engines—Langdon v. Google, 
TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (June 8, 2006, 12:46 P.M.), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives 
/2006/06/must_carry_laws.htm (“Recall that from Miami Herald v. Tornillo, a statutory must-
carry rule applied to newspapers violated the constitutional freedom of the press.  Given the very 
specific justifications for tighter regulation of broadcasting, and that those bases have been held 
inapplicable to the Internet (see, e.g., Reno v. ACLU), I think (for these purposes) that search 
engines are more appropriately analogized to newspapers instead of broadcasters.  Accordingly, I 
can’t see how any judge could constitutionally order ‘must carry’ relief here.”). 
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described in other work, its advantage is self-reinforcing: the better it is, 
the more searchers use it, and the more searchers use it, the more data it 
has for improving itself.51  Its sole serious rival in the United States, 
Microsoft’s Bing, has been losing hundreds of millions of dollars for 
years.52  There are even jokes about the importance of Google results, 
whether on desktop or mobile devices (where Android provides a whole 
other point of leverage to persistent dominance).53  If there is any place 
where Red Lion’s scarcity rationale is applicable today, it is in search.54 
IV.  A REFORM AGENDA FOR REPUTATION LAW 
The CJEU’s right to be forgotten judgment has led to a number of 
important decisions, largely by Google, about the proper scope of such a 
right.  Julia Powles has compiled some of these decisions, contrasting 
successful and rejected delisting requests.55  One particular example of 
a successful request for delisting, “[l]inks to ‘revenge porn’—nude 
pictures put online by an ex-boyfriend,” is particularly relevant in the 
United States.56  Thanks to the work of experts like Danielle Keats 
Citron and Mary Anne Franks, the issue is frequently on states’ 
legislative agenda.57  Moreover, Google itself has decided to provide a 
form in the United States to enable victims of revenge porn to have it 
removed from search results on their name.58   
 
51. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 73 (2015). 
52. See Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1009 (2013), 
for this fact and a general skepticism regarding search rivalries. 
53. As one goes: “Where’s the best place to hide a dead body?  On the second page of Google 
search results.” 
54. See generally DAWN NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE 
SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE (2009) (for more on Red Lion); Chandler, supra note 34, at 1095–
97. 
55. Julia Powles, Results May Vary: Border Disputes on the Frontlines of the “Right to be 
Forgotten,” SLATE (Feb. 25, 2015, 10:38 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/ 
future_tense/2015/02/google_and_the_right_to_be_forgotten_should_delisting_be_global_or_loc
al.html.  One example of a successful delisting was “[a] victim of physical assault [who] asked 
for results describing the assault to be removed for queries against her name.”  Id.  A converse 
example (of a denied delisting request) was a “[r]equest by a pedophile who wanted links to 
articles about his conviction removed.”  Id.  Powles offers fifteen examples of approved delisting 
requests, and sixteen rejected ones.  Her excellent work demonstrates how careful application of 
legal and ethical principles can lead to nuanced, contextual judgments that do reputational justice 
to victims of unfairly salient results while respecting the public’s right to easy access to important 
facts about public figures or those otherwise in a position of trust. 
56. Id. 
57. See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); Danielle 
Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 
(2014). 
58. Amit Singhal, “Revenge Porn” and Search, GOOGLE: PUB. POL’Y BLOG (June 19, 2015), 
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 As search engines adapt to the right to be forgotten in Europe, they 
will develop labor workflows and other processes capable of 
implementing the “mass justice” entailed by similar legislation 
elsewhere.  The following three sections of this Part explain potential 
implications for health data, credit data, and certain criminal convictions 
now covered by expungement laws. 
A.  Toward a Medical Right to be Forgotten in the United States 
Internet regulation must recognize the power of certain dominant 
firms to shape impressions of individuals.59  Their reputational impact 
can be extraordinarily misleading and malicious, and the potential for 
harm is only growing as hacking becomes more widespread.60  
Consider the following possibility: what if a massive theft of medical 
records occurs, the records are made public, and then shared virally 
among different websites?  Are the critics of the right to be forgotten 
really willing to just shrug and say, “Well, they’re true facts and the 
later-publishing websites weren’t in on the hack, so leave them up?”61  
If so, any patient is just one hack (and a few opportunistic 
republications) away from having her medical history instantly 
available to future business partners, counterparties, and other important 
decision makers.  
This problem may sound far-fetched.  But there are already shady 
markets developing in individuals’ “full medical histories” (via stolen 
life insurance applications).62  HealthCare.gov is a prime target for 
hackers, given the integration of health, medical, and citizenship records 
its proper functioning contemplates.63  Admittedly, if a state in the 
 
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2015/06/revenge-porn-and-search.html. 
59. See PASQUALE, supra note 51. 
60. Frank Pasquale, Reputation Regulation, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Aug. 6, 2008), http://con 
curringopinions.com/archives/2008/08/reputation_regu_1.html. 
61. Consider another matter of intimate bodily, if not health, concern: in the case of future 
intimate photo hacks, do we simply let republishing firms keep the photos available in perpetuity?  
Respected legal commentators have addressed this issue as well.  Woodrow Hartzog, Keep Nude 
Photos Offline?  Here’s a Better Idea, CNN (Sept. 4, 2014, 2:37 PM), http://www.cnn 
.com/2014/09/04/opinion/hartzog-online-protection-private/index.html; Lilian Edwards, Revenge 
Porn: Why the Right to be Forgotten is the Right Remedy, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2014, 12:07 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/29/revenge-porn-right-to-be-forgotten-house-of 
-lords. 
62. Brian Krebs, Medical Records for Sale in Underground Stolen from Texas Life Insurance 
Firm, KREBS ON SECURITY (Sept. 18, 2014), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/medical-records 
-for-sale-in-underground-stolen-from-texas-life-insurance-firm/. 
63. Cristina Marcos, Bill Would Allow People to Delete Profiles on HealthCare.gov, HILL: 
FLOOR ACTION (Sept. 23, 2014, 12:16 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/218627-
bill-would-allow-people-to-delete-profiles-on-healthcaregov. 
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United States tried to make the republication of such records illegal, it 
might run into the First Amendment strictures of Bartnicki v. Vopper,64 
which allows the publication of some illegally intercepted 
communications by those who did not actually complete the illegal 
interception.  On the other hand, as Danielle Citron explains in Hate 
Crimes in Cyberspace, Vopper is not a First Amendment absolutist 
opinion: 
 As the Court suggested [in Vopper], the state interest in protecting 
the privacy of communications may be “strong enough to justify” 
regulation if the communications involve “purely private” matters.  
Built into the Court’s decision was an exception: a lower level of First 
Amendment scrutiny applies to the nonconsensual publication of 
“domestic gossip or other information of purely private concern.”  
Relying on that language, appellate courts have affirmed the 
constitutionality of civil penalties under the wiretapping statute for the 
unwanted disclosures of private communications involving “purely 
private matters.”   
 Along similar lines, lower courts have upheld claims for public 
disclosure of private fact in cases involving the nonconsensual 
publication of sex videos.65 
Perhaps critics of the right to be forgotten want to sweep away these 
penalties, too.66  But if they succeed, there will be real human costs.  
Consider this story from a Stanford data breach: 
[DD], of Santa Clara, Calif., said her “jaw dropped” on Saturday when 
she intercepted the letter from Ms. Meyer addressed to her 21-year-old 
son, who she said had received emergency psychiatric treatment at 
Stanford in 2009.  Ms. [D] said it could have been disastrous if her 
son, who lives at home, had learned that his name was linked to a 
 
64. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
65. CITRON, supra note 57, at 209 (footnotes omitted). 
66. Some might also argue that Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), is relevant, 
because health data breaches might lead to analysis or inference based on the breached records, 
and that analysis or inference would be legal (unlike the breach itself).  In Florida Star, the Court 
ruled that a newspaper had the right to publish “truthful information about a matter of public 
significance,” even though the information should not have been released.  Id. at 533. Florida 
Star was a major victory for media defendants, and might protect some of the republishers 
mentioned above.  However, to the extent search engines constantly disclaim responsibilities as 
publishers with respect to intellectual property complaints, their opportunistic efforts to shoehorn 
themselves into this category should be treated with skepticism.  Moreover, Florida Star also 
emphasized the “public significance” of the information involved—something not immediately 
apparent in any private person’s medical record.  See also Frank Pasquale, Redescribing Health 
Privacy: The Importance of Information Policy, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 95, 103 (2014) 
(describing the need for health privacy policy to move beyond merely guarding sensitive 
information, to more aggressively address the improper use and dissemination of breached data). 
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mental health diagnosis.  “My son, I can tell you, is fragile and 
confused enough that this would have sent him over the edge,” Ms. 
[D] said, saying she decided to speak publicly now because of her 
frustration with the breach.  “Everyone with an electronic medical 
record is at risk, and that means everyone.”67 
Internet firms can be held legally responsible to prevent endless 
republication of this man’s psychiatric record.  It is a purely private 
matter.  Delisting is therefore congruent with venerable protections like 
those available to consumers pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(“FCRA”).  The elevation of such listings in search results on a person’s 
name is a matter of algorithmic data processing, not personal (or even 
corporate) expression.68  It is time to stop treating the right to be 
forgotten as some bizarre European dirigisme, and recognize instead 
its pivotal role in guaranteeing a digital future where our reputations are 
not at the mercy of malicious hackers and careless search engines.69 
B.  Revitalizing FCRA 
The FCRA requires that bankruptcies be removed from consumers’ 
credit reports one decade after they occur.70  When the FCRA was 
passed, credit reports were the primary reputational source for the 
decision makers covered by the FCRA, including banks, employers, and 
landlords.71  Given the devastating impact a bankruptcy can have on an 
individual’s reputation and credit history, this element of the FCRA was 
a particularly important advance in giving individuals a fresh start.  
Legislators wisely observed that a “fresh start,” a core rationale for 
 
67. Kevin Sack, Patient Data Posted Online in Major Breach of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/us/09breach.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
68. Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2013) (“Too much protection 
would threaten to constitutionalize many areas of commerce and private concern without 
promoting the values of the First Amendment.”).  But see Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and 
Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445 (2013) (disputing Wu’s approach to algorithms and speech).  I 
have tried to find a middle ground between Wu’s and Benjamin’s positions, which is reflected in 
this piece: Frank Pasquale, Automated Arrangement of Information: Speech, Conduct, and 
Power, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 25, 2012), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/ 
06/automated-arrangement-of-information-speech-conduct-and-power.html. 
69. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE (2009). 
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1) (2012) (“[N]o consumer reporting agency may make any 
consumer report containing . . . [bankruptcies that] antedate the report by more than 10 years.”). 
71. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 602(a)(3)–(4), 84 Stat. 1127, 
1128 (“Consumer reporting agencies have assumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating 
consumer credit and other information on consumers.  There is a need to insure that consumer 
reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect 
for the consumer’s right to privacy.”). 
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bankruptcy protections themselves, would be a hollow victory if 
bankruptcy ended up a reputational albatross on the necks of former 
debtors, almost certainly preventing them from participating in the 
credit economy on terms that reflected their post-bankruptcy behavior.  
Over the past decade, a new reputational intermediary has become, in 
many contexts, at least as powerful as the consumer reporting agencies 
that were the main targets of FCRA.  General-purpose search engines 
(and people-search sites in particular) enable the nosy to ferret out all 
manner of information attached to a person’s name.  Some might be 
important, but there are bound to be, for many job applicants, loan 
applicants, and others, bits of scurrilous information of dubious 
provenance as well. 
In other work, I have discussed ways of regulating end users of this 
information, in order to make employment and credit processes more 
transparent.72  But it is important for regulators to take a 
comprehensive, multi-pronged approach.  And that is where the key 
CJEU case on the right to be forgotten, Google Spain, is directly on 
point.73  In that case, a Barcelona newspaper digitized its archives, 
making available to search engines like Google official announcements 
published in the paper in 1998 of the auctioning of properties for 
repayment of debts.74  Mario Costeja González was a co-owner of one 
of the properties, and his name was listed.75  According to uncontested 
accounts of the case, the debt was rectified, and by 2009 at the latest, 
Costeja González had no delinquent obligations outstanding.76  Costeja 
González asked the newspaper to remove the announcement, and it 
refused.77  He then asked Google Spain (a subsidiary of Google Inc., 
which actually runs the search engine) to stop returning the digitized 
newspaper page in response to queries on his name.78  It referred the 
matter to Google Inc., based in the United States, which also refused.79 
Costeja González then filed a complaint with the Agencia Española 
 
72. PASQUALE, supra note 51, at ch. 5. 
73. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), 
(May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&docla 
ng=EN [http://perma.cc/ED5L-DZRK]. 
74. Lee A. Bygrave, A Right to be Forgotten?, COMM. ACM, Jan. 2015, at 35–36. 
75. Id. 
76. Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12, ¶ 15 (“Mr Costeja González stated in this context that 
the attachment proceedings concerning him had been fully resolved for a number of years and 
that reference to them was now entirely irrelevant.”). 
77. Bygrave, supra note 74, at 36. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
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de Protección de Datos (“AEPD”), which ruled in his favor with respect 
to Google.80  Given that Costeja González was not a public figure, and 
there was not a public interest in perpetual dissemination of this 
particular website in close connection with his name by a data 
controller, the AEPD ordered Google to stop doing so.81  Google 
appealed to Spain’s National High Court (the “Audencia Nacional”), 
and the case eventually was heard by the CJEU.82 
The CJEU made several determinations about Google’s search results 
on Costeja González’s name, pursuant to authorities including the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,83 and Directive 
95/46/EC (the “EU Data Protection Directive”).84  It decided that 
Google’s operations in Spain granted the AEPD and CJEU 
jurisdiction.85  It then found that Google was a controller of data.86  
With those foundations in place, the CJEU ruled that Europeans have, 
under certain conditions, the right to have search results for their name 
delisted.87 
The rationale for the CJEU’s action reflected a good faith effort to 
balance the rights of the data subject, the search engine, and those of the 
 
80. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos [AEPD], Resolución No. R/01680/2010, July 
30, 2010 (Spain), http://www.agpd.es/portalwebAGPD/resoluciones/tutela_derechos/tutela_derec 
hos_2010/common/pdfs/TD-00650-2010_Resolucion-de-fecha-30-07-2010_Art-ii-culo-16-LOPD 
_Recurrida.pdf.  Many also forget that, in the Spanish case, the newspaper that published the 
notice about the plaintiff’s debt delinquency was not ordered to change anything about its files.  
So anyone who took the trouble to search that newspaper could find out about the record at issue.  
In that sense, the decision was less about erasing history than it was about managing the arbitrary 
or unfair creation of reputations by important data processors and controllers. 
81. Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12, ¶¶ 14, 17. 
82. See generally id. 
83. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 10. 
84. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
85. Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12, ¶ 1. 
86. Id. ¶ 33; see also Herke Kranenborg, Case Note, Google and the Right to be Forgotten, 1 
EUR. DATA PROTECTION L. REV. 70, 76 (“The Court does not accept that the role of Google, as 
the provider of a search engine, is only a passive one.”). 
87. Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12, ¶ 100.  The court framed the issue as to whether 
the operator of a search engine is obliged to remove from the list of results displayed 
following a search made on the basis of a person’s name links to web pages, published 
by third parties and containing information relating to that person, also in a case where 
that name or information is not erased beforehand or simultaneously from those web 
pages, and even, as the case may be, when its publication in itself on those pages is 
lawful. 
Id. ¶ 62. 
Data subjects’ rights pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter were key to the decision.  Id. ¶74. 
Note that the CJEU cannot actually decide the case; instead, its role is to answer questions asked 
by national courts about how EU law should be interpreted. 
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public.  Data controllers’ links of names to data that is “inadequate, 
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive” could be challenged.88  
But the success of challenges should hinge “on the nature of the 
information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private 
life and on the interest of the public in having that information, an 
interest which may vary, in particular, according to the role played by 
the data subject in public life.”89  In other words, whereas public figures 
or newsworthy events should have links preserved, private ones of 
interest to only a few should not.  And recent data has confirmed that 
the right to be forgotten has indeed been invoked mainly by those it was 
intended to help: data subjects worried about the impact of erroneous, 
misleading, unfair, excessive, or unrepresentative search results.90 
In the U.S. context, the FCRA could be amended to reflect similar 
concerns, or a new Fair Reputation Reporting Act (“FRRA”) could be 
enacted.91  To the extent Google or other general-purpose search 
engines are being used for the same purposes as the consumer reporting 
agencies are, it does a data subject little good to have a bankruptcy 
wiped off a credit report if it can easily be found via a Google search on 
the data subject’s name.  A modernized FCRA would also require 
search engines (above a certain size threshold92) to eliminate such 
 
88. Id. ¶ 93 (“It follows from those requirements, laid down in Article 6(1)(c) to (e) of 
Directive 95/46, that even initially lawful processing of accurate data may, in the course of time, 
become incompatible with the directive where those data are no longer necessary in the light of 
the purposes for which they were collected or processed.  That is so in particular where they 
appear to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to those 
purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed.”). 
89. Id. ¶ 81.  Note, too, that the CJEU stated that the “data subject’s rights . . . also override, as 
a general rule, that interest of internet users.”  Id.  Miquel Peguera has argued that the balance has 
not been properly struck.  Miquel Peguera, The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be Delisted, 18 
VAND. J. OF ENT. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs 
tract_id=2641876. 
90. Sylvia Tippman & Julia Powles, Google Accidentally Reveals Data on ‘Right to be 
Forgotten’ Requests, GUARDIAN (July 14, 2015, 9:28 AM) (“Data shows 95% of Google privacy 
requests are from citizens out to protect personal and private information—not criminals, 
politicians and public figures.”). 
91. Frank Pasquale, Reputation Regulation: Disclosure and the Challenge of Clandestinely 
Commensurating Computing, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND 
REPUTATION (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010) (first mention of a FRRA). 
92. See, e.g., The Employer Shared Responsibility Payment, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https:// 
www.healthcare.gov/small-businesses/what-is-the-employer-shared-responsibility-payment/ (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2015) (explaining that the Affordable Care Act employer mandate is limited to 
employers with more than fifty employees).  Size of entity matters in search engine regulation.  
Some tiny upstart should not be subject to all of the scrutiny that a dominant company like 
Google is.  We see this type of differentiation in law all the time: different employers are subject 
to different types of rules in all types of contexts, depending on their size. 
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results in response to name searches, or at the very least to deprioritize 
them.93  As in Google Spain, such a rule would not disappear the 
information entirely—searchers could still consult court records or other 
databases unaffected by the legislation.  But it would bring some 
obscurity to records that, at present, threaten to unfairly and 
permanently define persons on the basis of a single mistake or issue. 
Some critics will say that it should be up to data controllers or 
furnishers or reporting agencies to make good faith decisions about how 
long to maintain information.  However, it is now almost always the 
case that it is more advantageous, and cheaper, to keep data than to 
delete it.  Even firms that say they expunge damning data after a certain 
period of time often fail to abide by such promises.94  Legislation like a 
FRRA would enable citizens to be more secure in the knowledge that 
they have some say in the rapid, algorithmically generated data dossiers 
that now have so much influence on reputation and opportunity.  And 
recent FCRA cases involving Spokeo and LinkedIn indicate that there is 
growing pressure to modernize regulatory treatment of digital 
dossiers.95 
C.  Realizing the Aims of Expungement and Sealed Juvenile Records in 
a Digital Age 
The United States faces a massive problem of excessive incar-
ceration.96  And once incarceration ends, collateral consequences pile 
up for ex-convicts.97  These consequences include hiring practices 
 
93. For more on the impact of deprioritization as downranking, see Allyson Haynes Stuart, 
Google Search Results: Buried If Not Forgotten, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 463 (2014). 
94. Elizabeth A. Harris, Tackling the Tenant Blacklist with New Legislation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/realestate/11posting.html (“Names are meant to be 
expunged after seven years, she said, but some companies are not careful about purging their 
records.”); Julie Satow, On the List, and Not in a Good Way, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/nyregion/a-tenant-blacklist-culled-from-tedium.html.  These 
may be consumer reports covered by FCRA; see Dalie Jimenez (@daliejimenez), TWITTER (July 
19, 2015, 11:28 AM), https://twitter.com/daliejimenez/status/622835360167514112. 
95. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1892 
(2015) (suit under FCRA alleging website contained false information about plaintiff); In Re 
LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (class action tort suit 
alleging that LinkedIn had failed to protect the privacy of its users). 
96. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS 40–44 (2011) (describing 
neoliberal penality); James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal 
Records, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 387 (2006); James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding 
Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177 (2008); 
Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 322, 
323. 
97. Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
 
16_PASQUALE FINAL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2015  7:06 PM 
2015] Reforming the Law of Reputation 535 
biased against hiring ex-convicts (and sometimes even those who have 
merely been arrested).  The problem is especially acute for juvenile 
offenders, who risk having their entire work life checkered by a single 
conviction when young.  Though juvenile records are sealed, news 
accounts or other reports may spread word of youthful transgressions.98 
Expungement has been an important way of eliminating the stigma 
resulting from some arrests and convictions.99  Some enterprising law 
students and attorneys have developed apps to accelerate the 
expungement process.100  But in an age when newspapers or blogs may 
be reporting arrests, there is no guarantee that merely removing one’s 
name from an official database will render one’s reputation untarnished 
by news of an arrest.101  The official sources of such data may even be 
selling it to private data brokers.102  Given these digital sources of data, 
new ways of thinking are necessary to realize the goals of expungement 
law.103 
 
POL’Y 963 (2013); Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-
Violent Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155 (2010); Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their 
Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753 (2011); Margaret Colgate Love, The Debt That Can Never Be 
Paid: A Report Card on the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2006, at 
16. 
98. Michael H. Jagunic, The Unified “Sealed” Theory: Updating Ohio’s Record-Sealing 
Statute for the Twenty-First Century, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 161 (2011). 
99. See Amy Shlosberg et al., Expungement and Post-Exoneration Offending, 104 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 353 (2014) (discussing a fifty-state survey on the varieties of expungement 
laws.)  Five states and the federal government have no expungement options; the states with 
expungement regimes differ in what offenses are eligible for expungement, whether convictions 
or arrest records are eligible, and the burden the petitioner must meet. 
100. Jason Tashea & Jon Tippens, Helping Expunge an Inaccurate Criminal Record, 
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-tashea/helping-expunge-inaccurate-cr 
iminal-record_b_6988750.html (last updated June 1, 2015, 5:50 AM) (co-founders of the 
National Expungement Project describe their work in creating ExpungeMaryland.org, an accurate 
online resource for those who need criminal records expunged). 
101. Clay Calvert & Jerry Bruno, When Cleansing Criminal History Clashes With the First 
Amendment and Online Journalism: Are Expungement Statutes Irrelevant in the Digital Age?, 19 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 123 (2010); Amy Shlosberg, Even Mandery & Valerie West, The 
Expungement Myth, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1229 (2011-2012). 
102. NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & STATISTICS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK 
FORCE ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORD INFORMATION (2005), 
http://www.search.org/files/pdf/RNTFCSCJRI.pdf; Logan Danielle Wayne, The Data-Broker 
Threat: Proposing Federal Legislation to Protect Post-Expungement Privacy, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 253 (2012); see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How 
ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law 
Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004) (describing reverse information flow); 
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence 
Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441 (2011). 
103. Meg Leta Ambrose, Nicole Friess & Jill Van Matre, Seeking Digital Redemption: The 
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Data-use laws have focused on initiatives like “ban the box,” which 
prohibit employers from asking about applicants’ prior convictions at 
the initial application stage.104  But at present, extant, weak law 
regulating background checks is not well enforced.105  This means that 
a real solution to the problem of excessively stigmatic encounters with 
the criminal justice system will need to be addressed by looking to the 
source of data and intermediaries that increase its salience. 
Some might argue that, given well-litigated First Amendment cases 
regarding media defendants who published stories on criminal records, 
the battle to expunge some criminal histories from results generated by 
large search engines will inevitably run into constitutional limits.  
However, search engines themselves, in case after case, have disclaimed 
an identity as a publisher—they style their work as that of a conduit, not 
a producer of content.  This is the foundation of their immunities under 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) and the 
Communications Decency Act.  Firms should not be able to 
opportunistically claim non-media status in one group of cases, only to 
wave media status as a talisman in others.  Indeed, in DMCA cases, 
intermediaries do have an obligation to take down certain materials 
upon notice of infringing activity.  Given the already well-developed 
legal regime of notice and take down in the DMCA context, large 
intermediaries cannot credibly allege that it is impracticable to manage 
requests for delisting of certain material.  
Fortunately, Google itself is beginning to recognize such respon-
sibilities.  Mug shot extortion sites have tried to shake down anyone 
with an arrest record and a booking photo by publishing their photos 
and name and demanding money to take the record down.106  When 
these sites appeared high in the “image results” for name searches, 
 
Future of Forgiveness in the Internet Age, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 99 
(2012); Michael D. Mayfield, Revisiting Expungement: Concealing Information in the 
Information Age, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 1057. 
104. Christina O’Connell, Note, Ban the Box: A Call to the Federal Government to Recognize 
a New Form of Employment Discrimination, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2801 (2015); Michael Pinard, 
Opinion, Ban the Box in Baltimore: Allowing People to Delay Disclosure of Criminal Records 
Gives Them a Chance to Make a Case for Employment, BALT. SUN (Jan. 7, 2014), http://art 
icles.baltimoresun.com/2014-01-07/news/bs-ed-box-ban-20140107_1_criminal-records-employm 
ent-application. 
105. CTR. FOR CMTY. CHANGE & NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, THE “WILD WEST” OF 
EMPLOYMENT BACKGROUND CHECKS: A REFORM AGENDA TO LIMIT CONVICTION AND ARREST 
HISTORY ABUSES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2014), http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2014/Wild-
West-Employment-Background-Checks-Reform-Agenda.pdf?nocdn=1. 
106. Jane E. Bobet, Note, Mug Shots and the FOIA: Weighing the Public’s Interest in 
Disclosure Against the Individual’s Right to Privacy, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 633 (2014). 
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many with records on them were bullied into paying.107  But Google 
itself has altered its search algorithms to reduce such sites’ salience.108  
That is a commendable action.  But its logic needs to be extended to 
cover a wider array of persons unfairly stigmatized by the rapid growth 
of carceral systems in the United States. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Some U.S. commentators’ views are rapidly congealing toward a 
reflexively rejectionist position when it comes to regulation of search 
engine results—despite the FCRA’s extensive regulation of consumer 
reporting agencies in very similar situations.109  Jeffrey Toobin’s recent 
article mentions some of these positions.110  For example, one U.S. 
critic complains “[t]he [Google Spain] decision will go down in history 
as one of the most significant mistakes that [the CJEU] has ever 
made.”111  I disagree, and I think the opposite result would itself have 
been far more troubling.  Combine search results with incipient 
technologies of algorithmic scoring, “Google Glass” interfaces, and face 
recognition, and we could soon be in a world where each person one 
encounters can be instantly categorized as friend or threat, competent or 
pathetic, by software.  To declare such technologies of reputation 
beyond the bounds of regulation is to consign myriad innocent 
individuals to stigma, unfairly denied opportunities, and worse. 
The United States has long tried to balance privacy and free-speech 
concerns—neither free expression, nor reputational integrity, are 
absolute values.  The FCRA, for example, balances credit reporting 
agencies’ rights to process and report data about consumers’ pasts, with 
the public interest in ensuring that the reports are accurate, and also 
consumers’ interests in removing certain other items once a defined 
amount of time has elapsed.  Google Spain, which led to the CJEU’s 
seminal decision on the right to be forgotten, involved the reporting of a 
 
107. Id. at 634–35. 
108. Barry Schwartz, Google Launches Fix to Stop Mugshot Site from Ranking: Google’s 
MugShot Algorithm, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Oct. 7, 2013, 9:36 AM), http://search 
engineland.com/google-launches-fix-to-stop-mugshot-sites-from-ranking-googles-mugshot-algori 
thm-173672. 
109. Lilian Edwards, Three Myths that Need Nailed About the Right to be Forgotten (and One 
Question), POGOWASRIGHT.ORG (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.pogowasright.org/three-myths-that-
need-nailed-about-the-right-to-be-forgotten-and-one-question/. 
110. Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion: In Europe, the Right to be Forgotten Trumps the 
Internet, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/so 
lace-oblivion. 
111. Id. 
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credit problem that persisted for over ten years.  A decade is the cut-off 
for a bankruptcy report to appear on a U.S. credit report.112  So the EU 
and U.S. approaches to balancing privacy and free expression are not 
necessarily that divergent.  
The most important step toward legal reform in the United States 
now is for agencies to realize the full scope of laws like the FCRA, and 
legislators to expand their reach to the information-creating firms who 
are now defeating the purposes of the FCRA.113  If employers, insurers, 
educational institutions, and banks are using Google results in the same 
way as they use credit reports, Congress needs to expand the scope of 
the FCRA to achieve its original function and purpose.  Moreover, a 
fully developed right to obscurity would not only protect data subjects 
against the use of search results that are high ranking and thus easily 
found by a person.  It would also defend them against search results that 
are buried and obscured—and probably should be forgotten—but are 
accessible by a web crawler or algorithmic aggregator.  Such silent, 
subtle, and secret assessments of reputation can be just as important as 
publicly accessible search results.114 
Some techno-libertarians naively assume that such laws undermine 
the possibility of a truly universal library of all history being built by 
Silicon Valley firms.115  They stipulate Google’s index to be a record of 
everything, and castigate Europeans for capriciously deleting aspects of 
a historical record that Google, unregulated, would deliver in whole if 
only it weren’t for meddling governments.  But Google gives no 
assurance of such an archiving policy, and no one should presume that 
Google, unregulated, will present some absolutely accurate and 
 
112. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012) (stating the congressional purpose in enacting FCRA: 
“economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition among the various financial 
institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by 
the informed use of credit”). 
113. The CFPB is leading the way in exploring the full scope of FCRA coverage.  See 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, LIST OF CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCIES (2015), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201501_cfpb_list-consumer-reporting-agencies.pdf. 
114. Moreover, a regulatory regime focused only on those results salient to persons may end 
up privileging robotic means of processing information.  See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, 
Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2606731 (describing copyright law’s inadvertent privileging of 
robotic reading). 
115. Paul Bernal expertly critiques this assumption.  Paul Bernal, Wikipedia and the Right to 
be Forgotten, PAUL BERNAL’S BLOG (Aug. 24, 2014), https://paulbernal.wordpress.com/2014/ 
08/24/wikipedia-and-the-right-to-be-forgotten/ (“What the internet isn’t, is a perfect archive of 
truth, set in stone as a record of perfect accuracy.  To evoke otherwise . . . is simply false.”). 
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complete record of the past.116  Only independently verifiable and 
transparent algorithmic processing of information could do that—if we 
wanted it done at all.117 
Search results pages are not the pristine reflection of some pre-
existing digital reality.  They are dynamic, influenced by search engine 
optimizers, engineers within Google, paid ads, human reviewers of 
proposed algorithm changes, and many other factors.  No one should 
assume that these results necessarily amount to an expression of truth, a 
human opinion, some company stance, or some other aspect of 
expression that garners robust First Amendment protections.  If the aims 
of privacy, antidiscrimination, and fair data practices law are to be 
realized in a digital age, search engines’ status as data processors and 
controllers—their own dominant self-characterization—must take 
precedence over the “media defendant” status they opportunistically 
invoke.  Algorithmic arrangements of information should be subject to 
contestation based on societal standards of fairness and accuracy. 
 
116. As legal scholar Dawn Nunziato observes, “Google, in its capacity both as the dominant 
Internet search engine and as the operator of its popular news aggregation site, has engaged in 
various acts of censorship.”  NUNZIATO, supra note 54, at 12; accord European Commission 
Press Release MEMO/15/4781, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google 
on Comparison Shopping Service (Apr. 15, 2015) (“Google systematically positions and 
prominently displays its comparison shopping service in its general search results pages, 
irrespective of its merits. . . .  Google’s conduct has a negative impact on consumers and 
innovation.”).  In her book, Virtual Freedom, Nunziato mentions suspect decisions at Google 
News, Google AdWords, and the search engine generally.  See generally NUNZIATO, supra 54. 
117. Kate Crawford, Can an Algorithm be Agonistic?  Ten Scenes from Life in Calculated 
Publics, 41 SCI. TECH. HUM. VALUES (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 10–11) (“When the 
logic of algorithms is understood as autocratic, this poses serious problems when we wish to 
intervene in their process of governance.  If algorithms adopt deliberative democratic paradigms, 
it assumes an Internet of equal agents, rational debate, and emerging consensus positions.  This is 
not the Internet that many of us would recognize.”).  And just as we can ask “whether it is 
desirable or even ethical to persistently map every square inch of global terrain and make it 
available for electronic processing,” we should also question whether a perpetual dossier on each 
individual is desirable.  DAVID GOLUMBIA, THE CULTURE OF COMPUTATION 149 (2009); see 
also MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 69. 
